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## **Organizing across Difference and across Campus: Cross-class Coalition and Worker Mobilization in a Living Wage Campaign**

Jennifer Bickham Mendez and James O'Neil Spady

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## Organizing across Difference and across Campus

### Cross-class Coalition and Worker Mobilization in a Living Wage Campaign

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The authors analyze the practices and internal dynamics of a living wage campaign (LWC) at a liberal arts university to evaluate its implications for low-wage workers' social and economic justice struggles. A vibrant coalition among faculty members, students, and staff members demonstrated the complexities of organizing across racial, class, and status differences when participants hold different stakes. The campaign's diverse membership was its greatest strength and challenge, as campaigners brought with them key resources but also divergent understandings of the LWC's meaning and ultimate goals. Although the LWC's efforts at engaging in participative decision making, building relationships, and developing compatible frameworks of meaning created a culture of solidarity that invigorated the movement despite multiple obstacles, they were not sustainable. The campaign's dissolution and ultimate reformation as a union with a very different culture and practice raises questions about the strengths and limitations of LWCs and their implications for a revitalized labor movement.

**Keywords:** *living wage; unionism; campus organizing; cross-class coalitions; social movements; labor*

You know you put this label on our job like our job ain't nothin' . . . Basically what you sayin' is that we ain't doin' nothin' . . . You couldn't function around here without us. So, hey, you need us more really. We gotta keep up this environment for the kids.

—*Housekeeper reflecting on the living wage campaign, spring 2003*

What makes one deserving of a "living wage"? Is it that these William and Mary employees have the support of some resume-building, well-fed, \$40,000-car-driving, hypocritical, pseudo-liberal students?

—*Anonymous newspaper comment about the living wage campaign picket line, February 2001*

In Williamsburg, Virginia, on August 14, 2001, groups of historic interpreters in eighteenth-century costumes, tourists, and school children encountered a boisterous rally of The College of William and Mary's custodial staff, mostly African American women, and a few faculty and student supporters. Staged in Merchant Square, a shopping area adjoining the town's reconstructed colonial-era center, the rally used Williamsburg's central public space as well as its historic claim as a birthplace of freedom and equality to denounce poverty wages and assert the right to organize. The rally was part of a living wage campaign (LWC) organized and spearheaded by a diverse group of low-wage College employees, students, and faculty members. Over the course of sixteen months, LWC members collected approximately 2,700 signatures on petitions, held rallies and candlelight vigils, and maintained a noisy picket line near the administration building at the College.

The campaign resulted in some concrete changes. After appointing a commission to study wages and job satisfaction on campus, the College's president announced wage and benefits improvements, including a 22 percent wage increase that brought campus workers to at least \$8.50 per hour. This raise paved the way for further adjustments: the subsequent president raised the minimum wage on campus to \$9 per hour and provided a 1 percent increase to those earning between \$9 and \$12 per hour to address wage compression. Last, the LWC formed the independent William and Mary Labor Union, and in the months after the College announced these raises, this union voted to establish a United Electrical Workers (UE) local, completing the first successful unionization effort at The College of William and Mary in living memory.<sup>1</sup>

Despite the campaign's achievements, a closer examination of its internal processes reveals a more complicated reality of significant contradictions and difficulties. Participants' understandings and interpretations of the campaign and its outcomes diverged greatly. After raises were announced, students and faculty members were ready to declare victory, but some of the most active campaign members, particularly leaders who were low-level housekeeping supervisors and who did not receive a raise initially, found the results of the LWC both disappointing and demoralizing. Although the diverse composition and loosely structured organization of the campaign was

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exciting, dynamic, and encouraging in its mobilizing potential, it lacked the necessary resources, both human and material, to be sustainable. And as the campaign wound down and members began to focus on unionization, the most active faculty, student, and staff organizers were close to burnout. Although efforts to form a local were successful, the union seemed incapable of capitalizing on the dynamic culture of direct action and solidarity that the diverse group of campaigners had cultivated. The arrival of the union marked a decided demobilization of the campus workforce, with several leaders of the campaign bowing out with a good deal of resentment.

In this article, we analyze the strategies and internal dynamics of the LWC at The College of William and Mary to evaluate the possibilities and problems of this kind of organizing and discuss the implications of this case for organizing for social and economic justice for low-wage workers. What does this case of a social movement that paved the way for unionization efforts tell us about organizing under current economic and political conditions, and the more specific milieu of college campuses and communities in the conservative U.S. South? What lessons can organizers draw from the ways in which issues of difference and diversity played themselves out in the internal processes of this campaign, particularly in light of the labor movement's recent turn to "social movement" unionism and community-labor coalitions?

Our analysis challenges an oversimplified view of LWCs that discounts their transformative potential because of the involvement of privileged "outsiders" who "do for" workers. This case demonstrates the importance of the practices and approaches of a coalition, not just the social composition of its membership, for determining the democratic potential of such initiatives. In other words, in evaluating cross-class organizing strategies and outcomes, the democratic quality of internal decision-making processes is equally critical to consider as the degree of direct participation of rank-and-file workers. At The College of William and Mary, when the union entered the picture, a bureaucratic and centralized type of decision making and meeting style supplanted the LWC's more participatory and process-oriented methods. Given their positions as supervisors, key leaders who devoted time and effort to the campaign and risked their jobs on the picket line were excluded and marginalized when the union was formed, raising questions about the missed potential of unionization efforts due in large part to unions' structures and state and national labor laws, such as the recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) restrictions on the classification of workers able to join unions ("Union Leaders" 2006).

We base our analysis largely on our experiences and observations as participants in the campaign.<sup>2</sup> We also draw from an extensive archive of e-mails from the campaign's list server and other documents chronicling the events and meetings of the campaign.<sup>3</sup> And finally, we conducted interviews with workers, faculty members, and students who were active members of the campaign, asking them to reflect on the successes and failures of the LWC.<sup>4</sup>

Our analysis reveals the complexities of organizing across differences of race, class, and status when participants have different stakes in the struggle. The diversity of the

campaign's composition was one of its greatest strengths in that different groups of campaigners brought key resources to the movement, but diversity also represented a real challenge. Differences of race, class, and culture meant that housekeeping and custodial staff members, students, and faculty members brought diverging understandings of the meaning and ultimate goals of the campaign and used different vocabularies to "frame" their understandings. Perhaps the greatest challenge, however, was overcoming differences of status and privilege so that those most directly affected by the issues of the campaign, low-wage campus workers, took ownership of the campaign after it was initiated by faculty members and students.

Despite the many challenges faced by the LWC and the mistakes that privileged members of the campaign made along the way, there were identifiable practices in which the campaign engaged that bridged differences and fostered worker empowerment and collective action. The open, highly participative character of LWC meetings, with their focus on collective decision making and building solidarity and relationships, shared membership in campus life, and the broad, cultural resonance of the concept of a "living wage," mobilized campaigners and helped create a sense of a common cause. Participation in direct action by housekeeping and custodial workers heightened their commitment to the movement and led to workers' taking on leadership roles. We believe that the case of this LWC holds important implications for scholars studying the struggles of low-wage workers but also suggests effective and replicable practices for academics and activists committed to supporting working-class movements.

### **LWCs: A New Framework for Worker Organizing**

The worldwide drive to globalize markets, combined with corporate demands for flexibility and governmental emphasis on market-based, neoliberal socioeconomic policies, has eroded the standard of living and economic security of working people all over the globe. In the United States, the middle and working classes have experienced a decreased standard of living resulting in part from a neoliberal assault on the New Deal labor regime and from the shift from a goods-producing to a service-providing economy (Lopez 2004). In the past two decades, the United States has seen a decline in real wages (Pollin and Luce 1998, 5), and about 27.5 million people, nearly 24 percent of the labor force, earn less than \$8.70 per hour, below the poverty line for a family of four, even working full-time year round (Appelbaum et al. 2003).

The labor movement has entered a worldwide crisis. Union membership has fallen dramatically in nearly every country around the world, declining in the United States from 35 percent of the private sector workforce in 1945 to just 9 percent in 2000. Under conditions of economic globalization, union jobs in the United States have been outsourced at a rate that surpasses their share of the workforce, and in 2004, at least 80,000 union jobs were estimated to have been outsourced (Luce 2005, 423).

As many have noted, however, the crisis of organized labor does not stem from external factors alone (cf. Jarley 2005; Tait 2005). In the United States, a focus on “servicing” current union members, a turn away from rank-and-file organizing, and an emphasis on bureaucratized “business unionism” at the expense of grassroots democracy also characterized the trade union movement in the latter part of the twentieth century, as did the active exclusion of women, immigrants, and people of color (Lopez 2004, 347–48).

In the past decade, however, labor movements in deindustrializing countries have experienced some revitalization. “Social movement” or “social justice” unionism has involved the incorporation of diverse worker identities, a new focus on grassroots organizing, and the cultivation of strong labor-community coalitions. Unions such as the Service Employees International Union (SEIU); the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE); and Hotel and Restaurant Employees (HERE) have focused efforts on mobilizing traditionally underrepresented groups including “no-wage” workers, immigrants, women of color, and contingent laborers (Rose 2000, 102; Tait 2005). Other struggles to improve conditions for workers have occurred outside of the framework of traditional unions. Coalitions of organizations that do not necessarily represent workers, including nongovernmental organizations, community organizations, and workers’ centers, blend “community” and labor issues in a struggle for economic justice and to address local issues of poverty and inequality (Freeman 2005).

LWCs are one example of labor organizing that has involved coalitions of student organizations, religious groups, unions, and community organizations.<sup>5</sup> These campaigns began to sweep across many communities and university campuses in the United States during the 1990s and have been heralded as “the most interesting (and under-reported) grassroots enterprise to emerge since the civil rights movement” (quoted in Pollin and Luce 1998, 1). In 2001, Reynolds reported that there were seventy communities in the United States with active campaigns. By 2004, nearly 130 living wage ordinances had passed in the United States (Luce 2005, 424).

The relationship between LWCs and unions is also complex, and there has been some debate about the effectiveness of LWCs for improving workers’ situations. In some cases, unions have initiated campaigns when it becomes clear that they will be unable to win organizing campaigns, but some organizers have debated the merits of putting time and resources into a campaign that affects a limited number of workers. And it is questionable that LWCs are the best way to build strong unions (Levi et al. 2003; Luce 2005). Although labor scholars have extolled what they see as a revitalized movement (Clawson 2003; Early and Cohen 1997; Lopez 2004), critics have warned that some coalitional organizing, initiated by outsiders—community activists, religious organizations, or student groups—can compromise worker empowerment (Clawson 2003, 188; Early 2003, 6). For example, Clawson (2003) wrote of living wage and antisweatshop campaigns,

The course of the struggle depends on students or community activists; they decide what the priorities should be and they are the ones involved in a transformative process of struggle. The workers who will benefit may not even know a struggle is under way; they are not involved in decisions about priorities, and they do not learn and grow during the struggle. (P. 188)

Others have raised concerns about the recruitment of students and college-educated campus organizers as union leaders, a trend that potentially "avoids the hard, politically challenging work of creating a new organizing culture rooted in local unions and their community" (Early 2003, 6).

### **The Campaign at The College of William and Mary**

The College of William and Mary is a small public university with approximately 6,000 undergraduates. Traditionally, William and Mary has maintained a primary focus on undergraduate education in the liberal arts tradition, although it also serves 1,800 graduate and professional students. The College, as it is known locally, is steeped in tradition, with its home in historic Williamsburg, Virginia. This emphasis on tradition, combined with the College's location in an extremely conservative, "right to work" state, made it far from a hospitable environment for a workers' movement.

Early organizing efforts on the issue of a living wage in Williamsburg began in 1999. A campus organization formed by a group of graduate students and a few faculty members called the Tidewater Labor Support Committee (TLSC), which became the core of the group that organized the campaign, had been engaging in activities to support unions in the area. For example, TLSC members marched on the picket lines with striking United Parcel Service workers in 1997 and shipyard workers in 1999 in a nearby city. By the time the LWC at The College of William and Mary officially began, the TLSC had grown to incorporate a substantial number of undergraduates, themselves mobilized by the dramatic 1999 World Trade Organization protests in Seattle and the closer-to-home mobilization targeting the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington, D.C., the following April.

During the summer, a small group of graduate students and one faculty member from the TLSC attended the monthly meeting of a campus employee association and led discussions on working conditions at William and Mary. Faculty members and students asked the forty members of the clerical and administrative staff in attendance, the majority of whom were white women, to identify what they liked best and least about working at William and Mary and what they felt needed improvement. Twenty people from the meeting agreed to meet again the following month and continue to discuss the issues that were raised.

In the interim, TLSC members began to reach out to other campus workers not represented by the employee association. These were the workers in housekeeping and

residence life, the lowest paid workers on campus, who were predominantly African American women. Susan became the most active faculty member in the coalition, bringing her own graduate school experiences in organizing housekeeping workers at another public university to this effort. Susan made a flyer publicizing the meeting and highlighting the fact that a nearby state university had just implemented an \$8 living wage. The flyer simply asked, "Could it happen here?" Undergraduate and graduate students and faculty members helped get the word out to housekeeping staff members by slipping the flyers under workstation doors and seeking out custodial staff members in their buildings and those nearby to invite them to the meeting in person.

To TLSC members' great surprise, twenty people attended the September meeting, but not one came from the clerical employee association that had scheduled the meeting. Instead, participants were all African American women and all housekeeping staff members. At this meeting, workers spoke out about wages, conditions, unfair schedules and emergency duties, parking fees, and the condescending treatment from administrators. The group agreed to continue meeting and recruit others to attend. TLSC members focused on spreading the word about the next meeting to identify more issues and continue the discussion of how to proceed. By September 2000, worker mobilization was well under way, to the surprise and delight of the student and faculty organizers.

### **Organizing across Difference at The College of William and Mary**

The social composition of the LWC was defined by difference. Campaigners included three groups: three or four white, male and female faculty members; a handful of male and female undergraduate and graduate students (mostly white); and campus workers, the majority of whom were African American women (though there were also a number of African American men who tended to play a less vocal role at meetings). For the campaign to proceed, participants with varied stakes in the struggle had to come together to make decisions about strategies and goals. Mobilizing campus workers was made difficult by structural factors such as differing work schedules, the atomized nature of custodial work, and spatial inequalities on campus, which impeded the circulation of information about the campaign among low-wage workers.

The social invisibility of jobs considered "dirty work" is well documented (Glenn 1992; Rollins 1985; Romero 1992), and at The College of William and Mary, housekeepers and custodial workers had no space to be when they were not performing work activities. In most cases, they lacked break rooms, and if a group of custodial workers would gather for lunch in a student lounge in the library, they might be told that they were not permitted to take their breaks there. Others were told that they could not congregate in a graduate student lounge, because they "disturbed" the students, and most faculty lounges were off-limits as well. Housekeeping workers tended to gather outside buildings to take their breaks in liminal spaces such as doorways or public courtyards and often ate lunch in their cars. When one of the authors

asked a group of housekeepers if the room that the campaign met in was their break room, Sheila replied, "We eat here, but that's just because Susan [an LWC member and faculty member] is in this building."

Custodial workers and housekeepers' status as "second class" William and Mary community members was also clearly reflected in their lack of access to e-mail, the much vaunted discursive space of the new "global civil society." Despite College policy that mandated that all personnel be provided with free e-mail accounts, housekeeping and custodial workers had no way to obtain e-mail accounts or access computers, preventing them from obtaining important information about their jobs. Although the Internet had become a mobilizing tool used by nongovernmental organizations and political movements all over the world, here the digital divide was a very local issue. Although students and faculty members could be quickly mobilized to attend LWC meetings and activities using e-mail, most housekeepers and maintenance workers could not be reached. Campaign members supplemented e-mail with an elaborate phone tree, and two volunteers called everyone on the list to let them know about LWC events.

Once campaign members began to meet regularly to discuss issues and strategies, another difficulty was that, as Susan recalls, "the coalition's composition seemed to change almost daily." At an early, very well-attended meeting, the faculty member and a small group of graduate students recruited Frank, a housekeeping worker, and Emily, a housekeeping supervisor, to speak to the gathered staff members. Frank, who was a reverend at a local church, moved the room to call and response on justice and injustice at the College. After Frank's and Emily's speeches, the room carried a charge, and everyone was excited and motivated. But these two individuals eventually dropped out of the campaign, and for a time, each meeting seemed to bring new faces.

As the campaign got under way, a continuing paradox shaped its course. A core group of faculty and staff members spearheaded the campaign initially, but as committed labor supporters, they strongly believed that no effort would be successful unless workers who were directly affected by the conditions being protested took a leadership role and that unionization was the best way to achieve this. Susan explained in an interview, "We already knew that our goal was a union, but 'campaign' had more resonance with workers. In the back of our minds we thought, 'if all goes well, there could be a union.'"

After calling and running the initial meetings, faculty members and graduate student organizers constantly struggled to become "facilitators," not "leaders," and to counter the idea of faculty members and students doing "for" campus workers. Susan said,

We made a lot of effort at sitting in the back of the room during meetings. . . . We would be like, "We'll book the room, you run the meeting." They [staff] would say, "You should do this." And we'd say, "We won't do it for you. . . . You decide. We're just the record-keepers."

Thus, a major difficulty, given the way that the campaign had been initiated, was to create a "we," a collective identity that crossed status and class difference, and for workers to feel empowered to take on a leadership role in decision making and strategizing. An example of the continual struggle to develop and sustain such an organizing culture across difference occurred when a housekeeping staff member reminded her fellow campaigners that a letter drafted to administrators should use the pronoun *we* to refer to members of the campaign, rather than *us* for students and faculty and *they* for workers.

As time went on, however, a core group of housekeeping staff members emerged who regularly attended meetings and walked the picket lines, and two individuals from this group eventually began to take charge of organizing and running LWC meetings. Campaigners would often build meeting agendas on the spot, and all decisions were voted on with a show of hands. One of these staff members was a worker-supervisor who was later elected as the campaign's coordinator. And her position as supervisor encouraged others' participation, especially those under her immediate supervision.

### **Direct Action: Rallies and Pickets**

As campaign members continued to meet and organize, they began to strategize about how best to pressure the administration to meet their demands. Campaigners began circulating a petition, which listed the campaign's demands, but they also sought other strategies to increase visibility of the living wage issue. A pivotal campaign event was the "Thanksgiving rally," which was attended by 250 people and brought together students and College staff members to hear community activists, professors, students, and employees explain the situation of low-wage workers, express thanks for their contributions to the campus community, and urge the College to pay livable wages. That same day the College's Board of Visitors met within earshot of the rally and voted a \$30,000 raise for the College's president, bringing his yearly salary to nearly \$300,000. Also within earshot of the rally, the College's vice president for public relations told a local television station that the College did not have the authority to raise wages for its employees. In the following months, the LWC collected 2,600 signatures on its petition and held mass rallies and candlelight vigils on campus.

In early January, the Virginia General Assembly's Senate Finance Committee came to The College of William and Mary to hear local College and community concerns for the upcoming legislative session. A dozen employees and students decked out in living wage T-shirts were a visible group at the event, but they were not permitted to speak. In his presentation to the committee, President Sullivan did not mention any of the issues raised by the campaign, even though he had recently stated publicly that he would do all he could to address staff members' concerns and would bring them to the upcoming General Assembly session. His failure to even mention wages to the Senate Finance Committee had the effect of undermining his credibility

among campus workers, who expressed their irritation that he was "doing nothing." The president's demonstrated unwillingness to act prompted LWC participants to escalate tactics and begin picketing.

During employees' breaks and lunch hours, groups of workers, students, and faculty members gathered to picket at the president's house and office, located on a corner in Williamsburg's historic center. Protestors carried signs asking drivers to honk for a living wage. The peaceful pickets occurred without a permit and included dancing, singing, or marching picketers who sometimes occupied the busy intersection. Protestors usually numbered fewer than twenty people, sometimes only a half dozen. The pickets attracted considerable public and media attention and, despite some minor police harassment and complaints in the local paper, continued for months, giving many employees their first experience with public protest.

The picketing served to increase workers' sense of ownership of the campaign by placing workers in leading organizing roles as picket captains. The pickets also marked a publicly visible demand for recognition by normally invisible campus workers. The campaign received sustained coverage in two regional newspapers. Occasionally, television crews visited the picket line to interview workers and students.

After the picketing had gone on for one month, President Sullivan appointed a special committee to study working conditions at the College. In selecting appointees, he specifically excluded LWC participants. Instead, employee representatives on the committee hailed from the employee association and the Black Staff and Faculty Caucus, groups that had not played direct roles in the campaign. About forty campaign participants—workers, faculty members, and students—met and decided to pressure to join the committee or at least draw media attention to its exclusion of LWC members. Participants elected two representatives to attend the president's opulent inaugural banquet for the committee as uninvited guests. Representatives asked to be included on the committee, and when they were denied, they stood in the corner in silent protest until allowed to address the room. LWC members expressed their willingness to help the committee but also promised to continue picketing, because there was no reason to be confident that a committee that did not represent LWC participants would address their issues. Campaigners tipped off reporters in advance, and the next day, the stories that ran in two local papers focused as much on the protest and exclusion of LWC participants as on the committee's formation.

As promised, pickets continued through the spring and into the summer. In April, the campaign held a large march through campus to the president's and provost's offices to mark the first anniversary of the campaign. Although expectations began to rise, at the same time, campaigner fatigue began to develop. Tammy, an active member of the campaign who regularly attended the pickets, later exclaimed,

We were so tired. The pickets just went on week after week. No one knew how tired we were. [President] Sullivan wish [sic] we would just go away. He didn't know how bad we wanted to just give up and go away. But you can't give in. You have to keep going! We were fighting!

An August rally (described earlier) was held as a way to respond to rumors that some administrators expected the summer to undermine support for the campaign and that the departure of students from campus would weaken it.

## Diversity as Liability and Asset

### Diversity as a Mobilizing Force

As in the case of LWCs in other contexts in the United States, building an LWC involved organizing across differences of culture, race, and class (Nissen 2000). Because of the three distinct sectors that made up the campaign, the loosely constituted organization took on the character of a coalition established across race and class lines, with gender also playing an important role in the internal dynamics of activities and meetings.

One of the reasons that organizing was even possible was that despite differences, campaigners shared membership (though certainly not as equals) in the College as a workplace and community. Campaigners may not have known one another by name, but they were familiar with one another's faces. As Rose (2000, 129–35) noted, building relationships and rapport is essential to successful coalitions. In the words of one AFL-CIO organizer, "The important thing about coalitions is knowing the people you're coalescing with" (quoted in Rose 2000, 132). Regular meetings with a focus on process and discussion helped relationships develop within the coalition.

These relationships also became a source of mobilization and growth for the LWC. The effect of the extremely unusual composition of staff members, graduate students, faculty members, and undergraduate students drew the attention and interest of undergraduates and their organizations. Faculty members and graduate students actively sought out the participation of certain student organizations by attending their meetings to inform them about the campaign. Student groups and individuals would regularly participate in the public events of the campaign, such as rallies and press conferences, though they were less likely to participate in the weekly pickets. One student remembered,

Out of all the organizations on the campus that I was involved in, it was the only one that I ever knew of where graduate students, faculty, students and staff worked together and worked effectively. . . . It was like a level playing field. At meetings you felt like you could bring your ideas to the table and you didn't feel the hierarchy. That's why I was drawn to it. There was something very empowering about being able to stand next to a graduate student and a faculty member and feel like—they're my equal and they're my friend.

Notably, student and faculty involvement in the coalition also seemed to mobilize staff members. Tammy, a housekeeping supervisor, remembered how she got involved in the campaign:

The reason I got involved was that Susan [a faculty member] approached me. When I heard about what she was doing, I told everyone. I wanted a raise. A cause like that I thought I could fight for. And those who didn't fight—I had to prove it to them. They had doubt.

Workers seemed generally impressed that faculty members and students were willing to devote time and energy to an issue that appeared to have no immediate effect on them. The presence of students and faculty members at meetings, students' signatures on the petitions, and the student-organized fundraisers helped establish rapport and trust with workers. At meetings, an oft-repeated phrase on the part of workers was "We can't let down the faculty and students who came out to support us." Some housekeeping staff members noted that faculty members and students increased the visibility of the living wage issue on campus. Others believed that the support of the students strengthened staff members' resolve and commitment to the campaign. One worker commented in an interview, "The petition . . . made students aware that all the housekeepers was [sic] gettin' underpaid. . . . Yeah, they couldn't believe it . . . I never ran into a student that wouldn't sign the petition." Another said, "If people like that are willing to stand by you. You have to stand behind them. If they can take time off for you, you can take time off for yourself."

For students, the LWC dealt with issues that were immediately visible in their daily lives (Freeman 2005, 17). Workers who approached them with petitions or who picketed had faces and names, and their work was relevant to students' everyday experiences. Students who spoke at rallies emphasized their appreciation for what workers did and how the College would not be able to operate without them. One undergraduate said in an interview, "I think if nothing else, it made students aware of unacceptable treatment of the housekeepers. After the living wage campaign I guarantee that students would say hello and know housekeepers' names."

Despite initial reluctance, by the time the weekly picketing had gotten under way, numerous workers had become regularly involved in direct action. For many workers, this was their first experience picketing, and they found it to be empowering. A housekeeper supervisor who was a leader in the campaign remembered, "When it first started out you didn't think things were gonna change, but then as we went on and did rallies it felt like maybe something was really going to happen. . . . And I was excited about it!"

The diversity of the LWC coalition meant that different "sectors" brought different strengths, resources, and organizing abilities with them. Undergraduates were adept at mobilizing people and resources to hold rallies and other events that garnered media attention. Student organizations were already formed and could be tapped to attend and advertise rallies or other functions. In the early stages of the campaign, students were much more willing than workers to engage in extremely visible forms of protest such as rallies, because they had little to fear in terms of retribution from the administration. Asking supportive students and faculty members to

wear living wage buttons was a relatively easy way to increase visibility and raise awareness about the campaign, and the buttons became important symbolic and visual indications of community support for the initiative. Later in the campaign, student organizations even held dances, the proceeds of which benefited the LWC.

Students who wore buttons or participated in rallies may have been only marginally involved. Indeed, very few undergraduate students actually regularly attended meetings of the campaign or walked the picket line. However, their attendance at rallies, quotations in newspaper articles, and use of living wage buttons gave the impression of a broad-based student movement. And some members of the core of the campaign felt that this was an important reason behind the amount of tolerance on the part of the administration shown to workers who came out to the picket lines. "We didn't hear a peep out of supervisors about workers' missing more than an hour for lunch because they were on the picket line. There was little or no intimidation," remembered a faculty member.

Faculty members' and students' jobs and education involved the regular use and development of public communication skills, and as such, they were comfortable with interacting with the media (see Croteau 1995, 140). And in the early stages of the campaign, it was most often students or faculty members who contacted the different media to request that they cover rallies or demonstrations and then later spoke to the newspaper and television reporters. Notably, however, as the campaign continued, staff members came forward increasingly to tell their stories to the press, appearing on television on several occasions.

Students and faculty members were skilled at using "information politics" (Keck and Sikkink 1998) as a means to garner public support and raise public awareness about the living wage issue. Graduate students and a key faculty member gathered data and information about pay scales and university policies, which could then be used to develop and support arguments for a living wage. For example, faculty and student researchers found data about the large number of William and Mary housekeeping staff members eligible for public assistance. Students and faculty members also had greater access to e-mail and computers, which allowed them to mobilize participants for rallies. Student organizations had access to funding and people power to copy and distribute flyers and to advertise events and raise awareness about the status of the campaign. Students wrote editorials to the College newspaper and letters to the editor of the local newspaper.

Faculty members and graduate students provided information to workers that countered popular notions about union organizing in a right-to-work state. They researched labor laws and used meeting time to explain workers' rights and distribute information. A faculty member produced a flyer that read, "Yes, Virginia, you can form a union," explaining the constitutional right to form a union even where state law prevents public employees from collectively bargaining with the state. And faculty members' and students' social and cultural capital was useful for contacting outside organizations about the happenings on campus. A faculty member's contacting

the American Civil Liberties Union, which in turn wrote a letter to the College, precipitated College recognition of the right of workers to attend union meetings outside of lunch breaks. Although the whole coalition discussed this option and voted whether to proceed, the idea itself was closely linked to the faculty member's knowledge and professional contacts.

### The Challenges of Organizing across Difference

The LWC crossed major differences, creating multilayered divisions among the members of the campaign and major challenges to forming a coalition that implemented democratic decision making. Discourses about the "William and Mary community" to the contrary, hierarchies of status on the College campus meant that although LWC participants all worked, or in the case of students lived, on the same campus, they experienced that institutional space in radically different ways. The three sectors belonged to very different communities, cultures, and social networks. Differences of race, culture, and class and the segregation resulting from them created huge gulfs among LWC participants. And not only were the larger communities outside of the university divided by class and race segregation—workers generally commuted from low-income areas outside of Williamsburg, while students and faculty members resided in Williamsburg—but the College community itself was also cross-cut by inequalities.

The following example, recounted by Spady, who was a graduate student campaign organizer, highlights an important case of the challenges involved in creating a culture of solidarity (Fantasia 1988) and worker empowerment when organizing was initiated by students and faculty members. In this case, membership in different race- and class-based social networks made faculty members and students unaware of gender-based power differentials.

Early in the campaign, a local minister emerged as an outspoken participant in LWC meetings. An excellent and inspirational speaker, Rev. Frank even volunteered to emcee the Thanksgiving rally, ending it by leading the participants in a stirring version of "We Shall Overcome." Rev. Frank became the first person we cultivated as a spokesperson and leader. We didn't know it, but it was a mistake.

"I don't want you guys to ever put Rev. Frank in a leadership position again," Sarah told me one warm fall day outside the building where her housekeeping supervisor's office was located. Sarah and I had become friends, and I visited her there several times a week to talk and strategize with her about the campaign. I was shocked first by her angry, assertive tone and second by the attack on the reverend. According to Sarah, Frank had just been suspended for alleged sexual harassment. The alleged victim of the harassment was a woman deeply involved in the campaign. Sarah told me that everyone knew about his sexual misconduct, and I thought to myself, "I didn't know." Then I thought about how we, the academics, had been pushing Frank forward to lead meetings, speak at rallies, and talk with reporters, and all the while, "everyone" knew something we did

not know, about someone whom workers probably would not have chosen as a leader. That was the first, best lesson in the importance of the staff's social networks and the best reminder of the danger to the campaign from us, the academics, who could so easily kill it by running it. It's easy to claim understanding about the dangers of hierarchical leadership in the abstract. It's another thing to encounter and live it. We were forming a new social group out of the diverse set of people who all happened to work for William and Mary but who otherwise lived separate lives with not just different expectations and daily experiences but unequally different ones. We knew this but had to learn it anyway.

This incident represented a major disappointment to faculty members and graduate students, who had promoted Frank as a leader. To Susan, a faculty member, this incident was a clear representation of the "subtle politics of deference" that staff members showed to faculty members and graduate students.

### Discursive Framing

Different class positions, status, and membership in race-based social networks also meant differing vocabularies about the goals and demands of the campaign. For students and faculty members, the cause was one of economic justice and human rights. At the Thanksgiving rally, a student read the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to highlight how workers' economic and social rights were violated. At the picket line protests, students and faculty members made signs with slogans such as "A Living Wage Is a Human Right." At a much later rally, a student member of an anarchist group compared the struggles of campus workers with the struggles in Bolivia over the privatization of water: "We are part of a global struggle!" he proclaimed. Interviewed after he graduated, another student discussed his views:

The campaign was about justice. It was about structural change. The issue of justice was why this campaign was so important. You want to push the envelope as an activist to bring about institutional change and turn people into citizens who want to change their lives.

In perhaps the clearest example of how leftist students identified the LWC with the struggles of working-class people under globalization, two students performed a "living wage rap" at a benefit dance. The lyrics are telling in their framing of the campaign as resistance to corporate globalization and part of a larger working-class struggle (Mayburduk and Mercer 2000):

Invisible hand, invisible man  
 You talk about a free market  
 I'm talking 'bout a free man.  
 Governor Gilmore talkin' taxes & other filler but he's speakin' to the rich & he just  
 don't understand.

The people united will never be defeated.  
El pueblo unido jamas sera vencido.  
Put the power in the masses and in the working classes.  
Yo, we gotta work together to kick the fascist asses.

In contrast, staff members most often framed their demands in terms of respect and "more money." Staff members would speak of "being able to take my kids to Burger King" or "buy my kid new shoes for school," or, simply "We want more money." An active campaign member and housekeeper supervisor summed up her views in an e-mail to the campaign's list server:

Most [housekeeping staff members] would like to own a decent car and be able to make the payments. Most would like to be able to own a home or condo and make the payments. Most would like to be able to go to the grocery store and buy a steak sometime, or some brand-name cereal. One of my employees' sons wanted to play basketball, and she had to tell him "no." For there was no way to get him there and back, no \$35.00 for uniform fees, no \$40.00 for basketball shoes. Most kids want a computer at home but can not get them [sic]. What kind of life will the kids have? . . . Most of us want to get paid for the work that we do.

Even though the campaign's official demands were for job training, a sliding scale for parking, access to e-mail, and the ability to attend meetings outside of their lunch breaks, increases in wages were a primary focus and "framing" device for the workers (McAdam et al. 1996). In the words of one protestor, "We are out there on the streets for more money. Nothing else. More money!!!! I was fighting for a living wage."

Other scholars have noted this value-interest distinction within cross-class coalitions (Rose 2000, 188–96). Coalition members' distinct framing was thrown into relief during one of the picket lines. A faculty member downloaded a number of chants from the Internet that had been used at other living wage rallies, like the much publicized Harvard sit-in and distributed them as a flyer of suggested protest chants. Most of the chants involved themes of justice and rights. Workers, however, chose to compose their own chants, such as "You got yours; now I want mine!" or "Eight is great, but twelve is better!" And they held up placards to motorists with the words "Honk for more money!" Or they simply shouted at cars, "We want a raise!"

Workers' interest in earning higher wages, however, was inextricably linked to the value of work and workers as human beings. Workers associated low pay with "disrespect." As others have noted, *respect* is a term that carries with it deep cultural resonance within poor and working-class African American and Latino/a communities (see Anderson 1999; Bourgois 1994). And certainly the term *respect* became a crucial one in the LWC that workers mentioned repeatedly during meetings and pickets.

But perhaps at no point was the equation of money with "respect" and human value more apparent than when the administration suggested that an increase in staff pay be funded by contributions of 1 percent of the yearly incomes of concerned faculty members and administrators. (President Sullivan volunteered himself as a donor.) An

increase in students' fees was also suggested. At a meeting to discuss the proposals, campaigners voted to reject them. Although some housekeeping workers rejected the idea as too little money, others declared that they did not want welfare or charity; they wanted "what we're worth." "I wanted what was earned," said one worker. "It was time," said another.

At LWC meetings, staff members would decry the invisibility of their work and challenge the devaluation of their jobs. One housekeeper explained

You know you put this label on our job like our job ain't nothin'. . . . Basically what you sayin' is that we ain't doin' nothin'. Maintenance, the other people, and the grounds [crew], we're just as better [*sic*] as them too. You couldn't function around here without us. So, hey, you need us more really. We gotta keep up this environment for the kids [College students].

A major complaint from workers was feelings of being at the "bottom of the totem pole." Shirley said,

You feel like you're not worth anything. . . . No one gets us together to tell us how good the buildings look when we are getting ready for school to start. These bosses don't know half their people. We're just here to clean up and that's it.

Although participants used different words in framing the LWC's demands, the phrase "living wage" seemed to carry resonance across class and race differences. In Snow and Benford's (1988, 208–209) terminology, this resonance among workers could have been achieved because of high levels of "experiential commensurability," in which, despite some differences in words and interpretations used by different groups of campaigners, the broad living wage frame harmonized with the ways in which conditions were experienced by low-wage workers.

Others have pointed out that differing levels of cultural resonance of social movement issues and values as well as perceptions about the lack of representation of the interests of "regular people" are major obstacles to the creation of cross-class movement coalitions (Croteau 1995, 117–25, 142–47). In the case of the LWC, however, despite the differences in vocabularies used to frame the issues of the campaign, the discourse of a living wage combined with the relationships that were formed within the coalition seemed to form a bridge between the experienced needs and interests of workers (which were also inextricably tied to ideas about human worth) and students' and faculty members' commitment to political ideals.

The LWC's ability to connect bread-and-butter issues with larger political principles could have also had to do with the legacy of the civil rights movement and oppositional cultures among African American communities. This point is evidenced by the coalition's decision to highlight the concision of the anniversary of the birth of the LWC with that of the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and in choosing to sing "We Shall Overcome" at the Thanksgiving rally.

By the same token, though respect was an important discourse for workers, it did not resonate in the same way with those whom the campaign hoped to influence: campus administrators. Rather, at William and Mary, a university with a strong liberal arts tradition, liberal ideals, and notions of "community," characterized by respect for diversity; love of knowledge; and liberal, democratic ideals, were prominent in administrators' discourses. This notion of a College community jarred dramatically with workers' perceptions of the disrespect represented by their below-poverty wages. This disjuncture created an opportunity for what Keck and Sikkink (1998) called "accountability politics," to hold the president of the College accountable for his use of a discourse of community, when some members of this so-called community were clearly undervalued.

The LWC used several tactics to call attention to the gap between the administration's discourse and practice. The coalition was well aware that a potentially effective strategy would be to embarrass the administration to leverage pressure. Sarah, a housekeeper, recounted,

President Sullivan was embarrassed. He didn't want anyone to think that he didn't pay people a living wage. I remember he drove by us one day [on the picket] in a big, brand new car. He drove by with a hat on like this [puts hand to face]. But we said—"We see you in your brand new car!!! Oh, you can afford a new car. We can't!" . . . He knew that we saw that he made plenty of money.

And yet graduate students and faculty members were knowledgeable about how to use discourses to achieve leverage. For example, faculty members and graduate students suggested congregating at the annual Yule log ceremony, at which time the president, dressed as Santa Claus, reads *How the Grinch Stole Christmas* to assembled students. A graduate student member of the campaign composed her own Seussian version of the tale. In the first version, the president himself was portrayed as the Grinch, but after presenting the poem at a meeting of workers, faculty members, and students, faculty members suggested that the verses be revised so that the president had a chance to show the workers true Christmas spirit by giving them a living wage. After the Yule log ceremony, workers presented Sullivan with the petition and the 2,600 signatures they had collected in support of the workers' demands for a living wage, job training, and other improvements in working conditions.

### Victory?

In September 2001, after months of campaigning, collecting signatures for petitions, and walking the picket line, the coalition that launched the LWC received word that the administration would implement two raises of 10 percent to bring every campus worker to at least \$8.50. Also included in the presidential committee's report was a sliding scale for parking permits. An undergraduate student immediately declared victory on the TLSC's list server.

Exhausted, but elated, students and faculty members attended the next LWC meeting ready to plan a victory celebration. To their surprise, they met with workers who, instead of jubilation, expressed profound disappointment and outrage. For them this was no victory, because many of the most active members would receive no raise (they already made more than \$8.50), and the initial 10 percent raise for those who earned in the \$6-per-hour range amounted to pocket change. Worse still, with the new starting wage, longtime employees would make less than new workers until the second raise went into effect: too little, too late from their perspective. From the workers' point of view, those who risked the most seemed to benefit the least from the fruits of the campaign.

### **Unionization, Demobilization**

By September 2001, when the president announced wage adjustments, the campaign had been picketing for nine months. The original group of students and faculty members who had organized the first meetings of the LWC had been working on the campaign for a year and a half and were exhausted. Campaigners did not feel capable of continuing a longer term organizational effort given meager and depleted resources, and it was clear to campaign initiators that a more sustainable, worker-controlled organizational structure was needed. That summer, participants had voted to form an independent union, which it named the William and Mary Labor Union. And the coalition had elected two leaders, both of whom had been active members of the campaign, though they were low-level supervisors of the housekeeping staff, to run this autonomous union.

Several months later, however, after several meetings with North Carolina and Virginia representatives of the UE, campus workers voted to establish their own UE local. Shortly after affiliation with the UE, the elected leadership of the independent union resigned. New elections were held, with a dramatically smaller turnout, and a white woman who had been only marginally active in the campaign was elected as the new local leader. The UE sent a union field organizer to Williamsburg. Greg, a white man who had been a union organizer among industrial workers in the factory at which he had worked, had great enthusiasm for establishing a new local and developing leaders among campus workers, but he had rarely been to Williamsburg, and he had no experience with campus workers. Although the campaign won the right for employees to attend union meetings during work hours, numbers dropped dramatically, dwindling to five, four, or even just two individuals, president and secretary, neither of whom was a member of the housekeeping staff.

Fundamentally, this portrait of demobilization supports Clawson (2003, 16) and other scholars (Luce 2005) who see social movements as sources of social and cultural dynamism for labor organizing. The social movement characteristics of the campaign, including its emphasis on process, long discussions, and bottom-up

involvement, were all unintentionally suppressed once union staff members were "in charge." Simply put, UE organizers arrived and began the work of organizing before establishing the relationships and rapport that had characterized the coalition (even though, as we have seen, the coalition was far from free of its own set of contradictions and problems). Union organizers brought the union's culture and proceeded to initiate and organize a series of events and activities that did not emerge from campus workers' discussions. At union meetings, UE organizers often came with a set agenda in hand, ready to run the meeting, and offered little or no opportunity for changes or additions. There was little time for workers to discuss what *we* should do, except to ask questions after major decisions had already been made.

On top of this, workers were asked to contribute union dues from their already meager paychecks. The main objective of the campaign as articulated by workers had always been wage increases. Suddenly, the solution to workers' problems seemed to go against workers' stated interests. Workers simply had few reasons to believe that the union was worth the sacrifice of paying money out of their already small paychecks. Seventy people had joined the William and Mary Labor Union, which had no dues, but initially fewer than thirty joined the UE local, although the number did grow to between fifty and sixty by February 2004. But as late as July 2006, the College of William and Mary chapter of the union was among the smallest in the state (G. Waksmunski, union field organizer, personal correspondence, February 6, 2004).

The demobilization that followed the unionization of campus workers also stemmed from the employer assault on labor backed by government policy, such as the Taft-Hartley Act, which Clawson (2003, 15–16) and others have attributed to the overall decline of trade unions in the United States. Virginia's status as a right-to-work state was a constant source of fear and confusion for workers, who would repeatedly hear from outsiders and even faculty members and other staff members that it was illegal for them to form a union. And coalition leaders knew that a union did not have the right to bargain collectively with the state. The College's human resources department used this fact as the primary justification for not recognizing the union once it formed and initially denying workers permission to attend union meetings outside of lunch hours, causing a major difficulty for the union because workers in different areas (residential life and housekeeping) did not share lunch break schedules.

In addition, the administration used the coalition against itself once the union was formed. Low-level supervisors were among the most active members of the campaign, and their activities in the campaign paved the way for the workers in their division to get involved. When the campaign voted to form its own independent and unaffiliated union, a prominent and outspoken LWC leader was intimidated by midlevel administrators and warned to be sure that all employees were never late getting back from lunchtime union meetings. This had the effect of discouraging the participation of workers under her supervision and giving others reason to fear involvement. To make matters worse, because these women were called "supervisors" though they had only limited managerial power (they could not hire and fire), it was not clear if NLRB regulations permitted them to join a union, another point administrators used against the union effort.

## Discussion

What lessons can be drawn from the LWC at The College of William and Mary? In many ways, the campaign can be viewed as a success. First, the campaign did publicize and make visible the issues of wages and working conditions on campus and leveraged the administration to investigate and institute a raise. The campaign foregrounded social needs, countering an economic discourse of invisible market forces dictating wages. Awareness of the issue of the devaluation and unjust wages of campus workers with whom students came into contact on a daily basis was an outgrowth of the campaign. One interviewed student participant who characterized the LWC as a definite success maintained,

Students learned that it was not enough to smile across the counter. We changed people's minds about charity and justice and got people to realize, "Hey, people were busting their hump for me. I didn't have to clean anything up at William and Mary, someone else did it for me."

The combined focus on the value of work and workers in addition to the demand for more just wages was also a strong force for worker mobilization. By centering contestation on these values and not specifying a figure that represented a clear definition of a living wage, many different wage earners on campus, some well over the \$8-per-hour mark, were able to join and feel ownership of the campaign.

Despite faculty members' and students' role in spearheading the initial phases of the campaign, workers' participation in direct action fueled their commitment to the LWC and also countered messages of inferiority and devaluation that emanate from completing low-wage, low-status work. Tammy expressed feelings of community and validation from her leadership role in the campaign:

But that's something else that happened. We didn't know Res Life and Res Life didn't know us. Now everybody know everybody. And, now everybody know me. I got to be pretty famous. I'd walk around campus, [and people would say] "Hi, Tammy, Hi!"

The case of the campaign at William and Mary challenges a simplistic insider-outsider binary, a discourse that, incidentally, is often used in union busting. In the climate at William and Mary, a public university in a right-to-work state, it was the diversity and decentralized organizational structure of the coalition that allowed it to thrive for a time, precisely because "outsiders" had joined with workers. And the result was the development of a new community and culture of solidarity (Fantasia 1988) within the coalition despite the different race- and class-based networks that people belonged to and their differing levels of status and privilege. Indeed, as Rose (2000) contended,

Coalition organizing across class lines is ultimately the challenge of making outsiders and strangers into insiders and political allies. Issues matter fundamentally—but the

process is a *social process* of integrating groups that ordinarily don't sit at the same tables. (P. 144)

Insiderness and outsiderness are not fixed or static positions but shift and change depending on the situation and context (Naples 2004, 373). Our case highlights how the positions of who was an insider and who was an outsider were constantly renegotiated and how there were in fact multiple "insider" positions, identities, and standpoints. What we believe the case of the LWC illuminates are the ways through which methods and practices of the coalition, including decision making, interacted and intertwined with this process of insider-outsider renegotiation.

The campaign's coalition, however, was clearly not sustainable. The union brought organizational resources with it that seemed much more viable in the long term than the efforts of the exhausted coalition. And yet this same bureaucratic structure that seemed so necessary after months of campaigning turned out also to be a liability, at least in the short term. In an interview, Shirley reflected on the differences between the LWC and the union: "We had unity then [during the LWC]. It didn't have nothing to do with the union."

Although it may seem that faculty members and graduate students were "outsiders," and an experienced union organizer who was himself a lifelong working-class wage earner would be able to relate quickly to workers' concerns, the fact that the union's organizers were unable (because of a lack of time and funding) to get to know workers and the work environment made organizers appear to be out of touch. One of the few things that the coalition had that united it was common membership in "campus life."

Diversity and decentralization stimulated and sustained mobilization for a time. The campaign's composition brought resources to the movement, including access to space on campus, e-mail, and student organizations. Unlike the coalition, however, membership in the union was perceived to be restricted to certain campus workers, and NLRB regulations required that it exclude supervisors who had devoted great efforts to the campaign. This restriction was highlighted by management, who intimidated low-level supervisors and told them that they were not permitted to participate. In this way, the union quite unintentionally enhanced management's divide-and-conquer strategy. To make matters worse, low-level supervisors already felt marginalized from organizing efforts because many of them had not received raises. Although faculty members and graduate students who were employed at the College could join the union, the impression prevailed that this was an organization by and for the staff.

Devoting more effort to maintaining the coalition with its diverse membership could have helped sustain the movement, though this would have been difficult given the level of burnout and exhaustion on the part of the most active members of the campaign. This conclusion supports claims about the effectiveness of initiatives such

as Jobs With Justice coalitions, which join rank-and-file action with nonlabor, community groups, while providing a framework for ongoing and more sustainable solidarity coalitions at both the local and national levels. Ironically, UE districts have a history of working with Jobs With Justice coalitions (Early and Cohen 1997).

One of the most viable strategies for maintaining the dynamism that characterized the relatively short-lived LWC was the character of LWC meetings, which were devoted to process, not just "getting things done." Workers expressed how getting together and talking was an important part of the unity that the coalition felt, and the meetings became a way through which relationships across race and class divisions were forged. Even if the LWC was not always successful, there was a general feeling that decisions should be made collectively, which differed greatly from union meetings, at which agendas were often handed down from a regional office.

In conclusion, we are not sure that at the time, anything could have been done to avoid the dissolution of the vibrant coalition that had made up the LWC. Current conditions in the global economy combined with the antilabor history and environment in the U.S. South are formidable foes. And yet the recent growth of the UE at The College of William and Mary and across the state is inspiring. The ongoing challenge is to harness the energy, solidarity, and mobilizing potential that can emerge within cross-class, racially diverse collaborations such as this LWC and integrate it into a revitalized and democratic labor movement. We believe that a careful consideration of the practices, successes, and challenges of LWCs such as the one that occurred at The College of William and Mary can contribute to the development of effective strategies for achieving worker mobilization, opening up pathways for worker leadership, and developing practices for privileged allies to act in solidarity without getting in the way.

## Notes

1. Longtime college employees said that they could remember failed unionization efforts in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1973, the state legislature barred public employees from the collective bargaining provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.

2. Spady was a member of the core group that initiated the campaign. He helped devise strategies; actively participated in rallies, pickets, meetings, and events; and often represented the campaign in the media alongside campus workers. Bickham Mendez was involved in a more peripheral way, participating in rallies and some pickets and attending meetings more sporadically during the eighteen-month campaign. Thus, we write from a position of political and personal investment in the coalition that formed around the issue of a living wage.

3. Spady maintained his own collection of LWC documents and flyers as well as an archive of all e-mails sent to the Virginia Labor Studies Center's Web site.

4. Unless otherwise indicated, quotations are from our interviews with one faculty member, two undergraduates, and eight staff members or from our own "field notes" during the campaign. Names used to refer to those involved in the campaign are pseudonyms.

5. For more information and analyses on the phenomenon of living wage movements, see Bernstein (2000, 1-6), Peirce (2001), Reynolds (1999, 4-7), and Niedt et al. (1999, 3-4).

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